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In the late 1980s the importance of highly nonlinear functions 
in cryptography was ﬁrst discovered by Meier and Staﬀelbach 
from the point of view of correlation attacks on stream ciphers, 
and later by Nyberg in the early 1990s after the introduction 
of the diﬀerential cryptanalysis method. Perfect nonlinear 
(PN) and almost perfect nonlinear (APN) functions, which 
have the optimal properties for oﬀering resistance against 
diﬀerential cryptanalysis, have since then been an object 
of intensive study by many mathematicians. In this paper, 
we survey some of the theoretical results obtained on these 
functions in the last 25 years. We recall how the links with 
other mathematical concepts have accelerated the search on 
PN and APN functions. To illustrate the use of PN and APN 
functions in practice, we discuss examples of ciphers and their 
resistance to diﬀerential attacks. In particular, we recall that 
in cryptographic applications suboptimal functions are often 
used.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an 
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The derivative of a real or complex valued function is a useful tool when study-
ing various mathematical and physical phenomena. By deﬁnition, the derivative of 
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function. For functions deﬁned over ﬁnite groups the notion of derivative takes a diﬀerent 
appearance and is closely related to designs and combinatorial structures such as, for 
example, diﬀerence sets [1]. If the domain of deﬁnition of the function is a linear space 
over a ﬁnite ﬁeld, then also in this case a close connection between derivatives of the 
function and its linear approximations can be established as we will see later in this 
paper.
In the late 1980s, new approaches to the cryptanalysis of block ciphers were intro-
duced. In his study of FEAL-4, Sean Murphy [2] exploited solutions of equations of the 
form G(x + a) + G(x + b) = d. About at the same time, Eli Biham and Adi Shamir [3]
studied the block cipher DES and showed that for some ﬁxed plaintext diﬀerences, cer-
tain diﬀerences in the encrypted values appear much more often than one would expect 
on average. Furthermore, they showed how one can exploit this phenomenon to re-
cover information on the secret key. These attacks have launched a lot of interest in the 
derivatives of functions deﬁned over ﬁnite spaces with the goal to mitigate the threat of 
diﬀerential cryptanalysis. While in the design of practical ciphers it is not necessary (and 
is sometimes even harmful) that the values of the derivatives are optimally distributed, 
also the functions with optimal derivatives, known as perfect nonlinear or almost perfect 
nonlinear, have drawn a lot of attention. The discovery in 2009 of an APN permutation 
in a ﬁeld of characteristic 2 and even dimension [4] has brought new motivation and new 
ideas to this ﬁeld of research.
The selection of results on PN and APN functions presented in this paper is not 
exhaustive. In particular, we would like to apologize if some important results are missing. 
Other surveys on APN functions can be found in for instance [5,6].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 by introducing the 
basic deﬁnitions. In Section 3, we introduce some further notions such as bentness that 
are closely linked with the notions of perfect nonlinear (PN) and almost perfect nonlin-
ear (APN) functions. The link with linear codes is also brieﬂy summarized. Section 3.3
is dedicated to the classes of equivalence which preserve the diﬀerential properties. In 
Section 4, some classical results on PN and APN monomial and polynomial functions 
are summarized. In particular, the relation between the only known APN permutation 
over Z62 and quadratic APN polynomials is recalled. Section 5 is dedicated to the expo-
nential and logarithmic functions and on the recent results on the linearity of related 
functions. In Section 6 we discuss several ciphers, and the use of PN or APN functions 
in practice. Diﬀerent approaches to the design and cryptanalysis are considered in this 
section. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this paper, we denote by A or B an Abelian group and by Znq a Cartesian product 
of n copies of the ring Zq, where q is a positive integer greater than 1. The results in 
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values of q and hence a separate treatment is often required.
When working with functions of several variables in Zq, we will denote by f a q-ary 
function with range in Zq. Then f : Znq → Zq, and if q = 2 the function f is a Boolean 
function. When the range of the function is Zmq , where m > 1, we will use a capital letter 
F to denote F : Znq → Zmq . In the case of q = 2, such a function is called a vectorial 
Boolean function. Capital letters will also be used to denote functions deﬁned in general 
Abelian groups.
In a ﬁnite domain, there is no question about diﬀerentiability of a function as the 
derivative always exists and is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. Let A and B be ﬁnite Abelian groups and F : A → B be a function. Given 
a ∈ A the function deﬁned by
DaF : A → B
x → F (x + a) − F (x)
is called a derivative of F . Given a ∈ A and b ∈ B the relation
F (x + a) − F (x) = b (1)
is called a diﬀerential of F with input diﬀerence a and output diﬀerence b.
Already since the end of the 1960s, derivatives of functions F : A → B such that 
|A| = |B| were studied in [7]. In particular, functions with bijective derivatives, called 
as planar functions, received attention. The introduction of diﬀerential cryptanalysis 
served as a motivation to study diﬀerentials of nonlinear functions and upperbounds to 
the number of solutions to Eq. (1).
Deﬁnition 2. (See [8].) Let F : A → B be a function and set
δ(a, b) =
∣∣{x ∣∣ F (x + a) − F (x) = b}∣∣.
We denote by ΔF the positive integer deﬁned as
ΔF = max
a∈A,a=0
b∈B
δ(a, b).
Then F is said to be diﬀerentially ΔF -uniform.
Clearly, we always have ΔF ≥ |B|/|A|. We say that F is perfect nonlinear (PN), 
if ΔF = |B|/|A|. This notion was studied for Boolean functions by Willi Meier and 
Othmar Staﬀelbach [9], who coined the term perfect nonlinearity for Boolean functions 
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is equivalent to the bentness introduced already in the 1970s by Oscar Rothaus [10], an 
NSA mathematician and Cornell mathematics professor, who is more widely known for 
his contributions to the development of the Hidden Markov Model.
The studies of nonlinearity of Boolean functions by Meier and Staﬀelbach were 
motivated by the cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. The introduction of diﬀerential crypt-
analysis of the block cipher DES by Biham and Shamir [3] raised the need to study this 
concept for S-boxes and nonlinear round functions which are nothing else than vectorial 
Boolean functions [11]. The following result about the value distribution of a perfect 
nonlinear function was proved in [11].
Theorem 1. (See [11].) Let F : Zn2 → Zm2 be PN. Then, for each y in the image set of F ,
∣∣F−1(y)∣∣ = ∣∣{x ∈ Zn2 ∣∣ F (x) = y}∣∣ = by2n2 −m,
where by is an odd integer.
As |F−1(y)| is a non-zero integer for at least some y ∈ Zm2 , it follows that PN functions 
from Zn2 to Zm2 exist only if n ≥ 2m.
The deﬁnition of bent functions was extended to q-ary functions in [12], and for any 
prime q, a function is perfect nonlinear if and only if it is generalized bent. Theorem 1
also extends itself to the general q-ary case [11].
In the case of general Abelian groups, where |A| = |B|, a perfect nonlinear function is 
also called planar. As the derivatives of a planar function are bijective, there exists one 
x ∈ A such that F (x +a) −F (x) = 0. It follows that a planar function is never one-to-one. 
On the other hand, for vectorial Boolean functions, if Eq. (1) has one solution, x, it has at 
least two solutions, (x, x +a). Hence the minimum value for the diﬀerential uniformity is 
2. If this minimum value is achieved, a function is called almost perfect non-linear (APN). 
More generally, a function F : A → B is called APN if it is diﬀerentially 2|B||A| -uniform.
While probably without direct application in cryptography a new deﬁnition of planar 
function has recently been introduced for vectorial Boolean function. In [13], a function 
F : Zn2 → Zn2 is called planar if for all non-zero a ∈ Zn2 the functions x → F (x) +
F (x +a) +ax are bijective. This notion which is not related to the deﬁnitions of PN and 
APN functions studied in this paper will not be further discussed.
3. Nonlinearity and coding theory
While most of the results concerning PN and APN functions can be generalized to 
any Abelian groups, we focus in this section on the special Abelian group formed by 
taking the Cartesian product Znq of n copies of the additive group Zq. In addition, we 
often assume that q is a prime, in which case Znq is a linear space and can be identiﬁed 
with the ﬁeld Fqn .
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Let q > 1 be an integer and let us denote by w ∈ C the q-th root of unity, that is, 
w = e2iπ/q. The Walsh transform of a q-ary function f : Znq → Zq computed in C is 
deﬁned as
fˆ(a) =
∑
x∈Znq
wf(x)−〈a,x〉
where a ∈ Znq and the notation 〈a, x〉 means the sum of the products aixi in Zq, for a =
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Znq and x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Znq . If q = 2, we have w = −1. For any prime 
q = p, the sum 〈a, x〉 is a scalar product in the linear space Znp , in which case the scalar 
product 〈a, x〉 = Tr(ax) deﬁned by the absolute trace function y → Tr(y) = ∑n−1i=0 ypi
in Zp is a natural choice.
The values of the Walsh transform fˆ(a) are called the Walsh coeﬃcients of f . They are 
used to measure the distance of f to the functions x → 〈a, x〉, a ∈ Znp . For q = p prime, 
these are exactly the linear functions in the linear space Znp . We deﬁne the linearity L(f)
of f as
L(f) = max
a∈Znq
∣∣fˆ(a)∣∣.
The linearity of a vectorial function F : Znq → Zmq is deﬁned based on the linearities of 
the non-zero linear combinations of its coordinate functions. Given λ ∈ Zmq \ {0}, the 
q-ary function fλ(x) = 〈λ, F (x)〉 is called the λ-component of F . The Walsh spectrum of 
F is then the set of all values of fˆλ(a) for all a ∈ Znq and λ ∈ Zmq \ {0}. The linearity 
L(F ) of the vectorial function F is then deﬁned as
L(F ) = max
λ∈Zmq \{0}
L(fλ).
For any function F : Znq → Zmq , we have
qn/2 ≤ L(F ) ≤ qn.
The upperbound is achieved by the functions x → 〈a, x〉. The lower bound follows from 
Parseval’s theorem. A function which achieves the lower bound is called bent if q = 2
and generalized q-ary bent in the general case [12]. When m = n, bent functions do not 
exist, see Theorem 1, which also holds under some additional assumptions for generalized 
q-ary bent functions.
For odd n and q = 2, the lower bound for L(F ) is 2(n+1)/2 and functions that achieve 
this bound are known to exist [14]. Such functions are called almost bent (AB). For 
even n, it is possible to obtain a function F : Zn2 → Zn2 with L(F ) = 2n/2+1 though it is 
still an open problem whether this value is the minimum possible.
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A list of known power permutations on F2n with the best known nonlinearity can be 
found in [15], see also Section 4.1. Among them is the inversion monomial. More generally, 
it has been a longstanding conjecture (see [16] for the characteristic 2) that all monomial 
functions are such that L(F ) ≥ qn/2+1.
One of the main tools Chabaud and Vaudenay used in [14] for proving useful and 
nontrivial results on lower bounds of linearity was the following theorem, which links 
the derivatives and linear approximations of a vectorial Boolean functions. Recently 
this result was used in [17,18] in the cryptographic context to show relations between 
statistical distinguishers in the diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis contexts.
Theorem 2. (See [14].) Let F : Zn2 → Zm2 be a vectorial Boolean function. Let δ(a, b) be 
deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2. Then, δ(a, b) can be computed as
δ(a, b) = 122n
∑
u∈Zn2
∑
v∈Zm2
∑
x∈Zn2
∑
y∈Zn2
(−1)〈u,a+x+y〉+〈v,b+F (x)+F (y)〉. (2)
Already in [10] it was shown that a Boolean function is bent if and only it is PN. For 
q-ary functions PN implies bent and the converse is true if q is prime [12]. Naturally, 
the same implications and equivalences hold for vectorial functions. The following result 
about the relationships between PN and APN properties can be obtained as a direct 
application of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Let F : Zn2 → Zm2 . If F is AB then F is APN. If F is APN and all Walsh 
coeﬃcients of 〈1, F (x)〉 are divisible by 2m+1, then F is AB.
This link between AB and APN functions has been used in the literature to ﬁnd new 
APN functions or to determine the diﬀerential uniformity or linearity of a function.
Later, the deﬁnitions of bent and PN functions presented in this subsection have been 
generalized to arbitrary Abelian groups [19]. In particular, a deﬁnition of bentness, which 
is equivalent to the PN property, is given in [20]. Let us present here the special case of 
additive Abelian groups Zq and Zr. Let us denote by wq ∈ C and wr ∈ C the q-th and 
r-th roots of unity in C. Then x → waxq deﬁnes a character in Zq for all a ∈ Z, whereby 
it suﬃces to restrict to 0 ≤ a < q. Similarly, we consider the set of characters y → wbyr , 
0 ≤ b < r, in Zr. Then a function F : Zq → Zr is called bent if for all 0 ≤ a < q and 
0 < b < r
∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈Zq
wbF (x)r w
ax
q
∣∣∣∣ = √q,
where wq is the complex conjugate of wq. The linearity of a function F : Zq → Zr is 
deﬁned analogically as above as
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0≤a<q,0<b<r
∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈Zq
wbF (x)r w
ax
q
∣∣∣∣.
Then √q ≤ |L(F )| ≤ q.
3.2. Linear codes
After the importance of nonlinearity and APN functions for cryptography was dis-
covered, many results previously found in the coding theory context obtained new 
interpretations. In this section, we recall how the minimal distance of a certain lin-
ear code is linked with PN and APN functions. Let F : Znq → Zmq be a q-ary function 
and let HF the (1 + n + m) × qn matrix deﬁned as follows:
HF =
⎛
⎝ · · · 1 · · ·· · · x · · ·
· · · F (x) · · ·
⎞
⎠
x∈Znq
,
the code CF deﬁned over Zq of the vectorial function F is the linear code with parity 
check matrix HF .
Results on the minimal distance (or weight enumerator) of this code CF have been 
derived depending on the property of the derivative of F . In particular, in characteris-
tic 2, a function F : Zn2 → Zn2 is APN if and only if the code CF deﬁned over Z2 has 
minimal distance 6 [21]. In the same paper, it is shown that when the function is AB, 
the related code CF has a particular weight distribution. The proof is derived from the 
characterization of APN functions.
While this result does not generalize directly to PN functions, it has been proved 
that the weight distribution of the codes corresponding to all known PN functions is the 
same [22,23]. Relation between PN functions and other linear and cyclic codes has also 
been studied for instance in [24,22]. In particular, it has been shown that the minimal 
distance of some linear codes deﬁned over Zp, p > 2, can be determined by the PN 
property of the underlying function F .
Among diﬀerent other applications, this link with coding theory, has been used in 
2009 [4], to ﬁnd the ﬁrst APN permutation over Zn2 , for an even n. More details on this 
function deﬁned over F26 are given in Section 4.2.
3.3. CCZ- and EA-equivalence
As shown in [25] the linearity of a function is preserved when composing the function 
with a bijective aﬃne function on the left or on the right side. The same statement is 
true for the diﬀerential uniformity. Compositions with non-bijective aﬃne functions do 
not in general preserve linearity or diﬀerential uniformity. Motivated by these properties 
the following equivalences have been introduced.
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tive aﬃne functions L1 : Znq → Znq and L2 : Zmq → Zmq such that G(x) = L2(F (L1(x)))
for all x ∈ Znq . Functions F and G are called extended aﬃne equivalent (EA-equivalent) 
if, in addition to L1 and L2 as above, there exists an aﬃne function L3 : Znq → Zmq such 
that G(x) = L2(F (L1(x))) + L3(x), for all x ∈ Znq .
The properties of linearity and diﬀerential uniformity are preserved by the EA-
equivalence [8,21]. The bijectivity of a function is preserved by the aﬃne equivalence 
if the aﬃne functions L1 and L2 are bijective. The bijectivity of a function is not neces-
sarily preserved by the EA-equivalence.
In [25] and [8] it was also noted that the nonlinearity and diﬀerential uniformity of a 
bijective function and its inverse are equal. With usually diﬀerent algebraic degrees, these 
functions are generally not EA-equivalent. In 1998, Claude Carlet, Pascale Charpin, and 
Victor Zinoviev further generalized the notion of aﬃne equivalence to a property that 
holds for a function and its inverse.
Deﬁnition 4. (See [21,26].) Two functions F, G : Znq → Zmq are called CCZ-equivalent if 
their graphs GF = {(x, y) ∈ Znq ×Zmq | y = F (x)} and GG = {(x, y) ∈ Znq ×Zmq | y = G(x)}
can be transformed from one to another using an aﬃne bijective mapping L in Znq × Zmq .
In the context of coding theory CCZ-equivalence can be rewritten as follows: two 
functions F and G are CCZ-equivalent if and only if the codes CF and CG are equivalent.
In general, establishing CCZ-equivalence of arbitrary functions is extremely diﬃcult. 
On the other hand, as many properties are invariant in CCZ-equivalence, it is often pos-
sible to determine cases of inequivalence. Functions for which CCZ-equivalence coincides 
with EA-equivalence are, for instance, planar functions, Boolean functions, vectorial bent 
functions if q = p = 2 [27] and vectorial bent functions if q = p is an odd prime and 
n = m [28].
4. Polynomials over ﬁnite ﬁelds
Any function F : Fpn → Fpn can be deﬁned as a polynomial over Fpn as
F (x) =
pn−1∑
i=0
aix
i,
where ai ∈ Fpn . In practice, for cryptographic applications, bijective nonlinear functions 
are widely used. Among all polynomials, monomials, i.e., polynomials with only one 
non-zero coeﬃcient ai, have been extensively studied and have been used as the main 
nonlinear component in cryptographic primitives such as in the AES block cipher [29].
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Known APN monomials in characteristic 2: Fd : F2n → F2n , x 
→ xd.
d Conditions Ref.
2t + 1 1 ≤ t ≤ n/2, gcd(t, n) = 1 [30,8]
22t − 2t + 1 2 ≤ t ≤ n/2, gcd(t, n) = 1 [31]
2m + 3 n = 2m + 1 [32,33]
2m + 2
m
2 − 1 n = 2m + 1 and m even [34,35]
2m + 2
3m+1
2 − 1 n = 2m + 1 and m odd [34,35]
2n−1 − 1 n odd [8,36]
24g + 23g + 22g + 2g − 1 n = 5g [37]
4.1. Monomials
In this section, we denote a monomial as a function Fd : Fpn → Fpn , x → xd. 
Monomials, or power functions, are bijective if and only if the exponent d is co-prime 
with the order pn − 1 of the ﬁeld. As the mapping w → wpi is a linear isomorphism in 
Fpn , all monomials Fe(x) = xe with e in the cyclotomic class {pi · d | 0 ≤ i < n}, have 
the same diﬀerential uniformity and nonlinearity as the monomial Fd(x) = xd. Results 
on monomials are often formulated with regard to the least exponent in the cyclotomic 
class.
Among all polynomials, monomial functions are mathematically easy to study. In 
particular, all derivatives have similar properties and the diﬀerential uniformity can be 
computed by studying only one derivative, usually D1Fd. By a substitution, one can 
show that for a 
= 0, δ(a, b) = δ(1, b/ad). For b = 0, the value δ(1, 0), can be computed 
as δ(1, 0) = gcd(d, pn − 1) − 1, and in particular a monomial function is bijective if and 
only if δ(1, 0) = 0.
In Table 1, we summarize the list of monomials which have been proved APN in 
characteristic 2. Not all of these functions are bijective. In particular, it is well known 
that all APN monomials are bijective for odd n and non-bijective for even n. As the 
monomials with exponents of Hamming weight 2 are quadratic, their derivatives are 
linear polynomials, and hence among these functions ﬁnding the APN ones is easy. 
For the inverse monomial, the study of the derivative leads to solving an equation of 
degree two, hence giving either two or no solutions for n odd, in which case the function 
is APN. For even n, two more solutions can exist, and the function is diﬀerentially 
4-uniform [8].
For characteristic p > 2 and for n > 4, known PN monomials are summarized in 
Table 2. Similarity between the APN monomials in characteristic 2 and the PN ones in 
larger characteristic deserves to be noticed. In particular, the derivatives of quadratic 
functions are 2-to-1 in characteristic 2 and bijective in characteristic p > 2.
The question, if the list of PN or APN monomials provided in Tables 1 and 2 is 
complete, remains an open problem. Research towards answering this question has lead 
to focusing the study on the exceptional monomials.
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Known PN monomials in characteristic p odd Fd : Fpn → Fpn , x 
→ xd, PN for many n.
d Conditions Ref.
2 –
pt + 1 n/ gcd(n, t) is odd
(pt + 1)/2 p = 3, t is odd, gcd(n, t) = 1 [38]
Deﬁnition 5. A PN (resp. APN) monomial Fd deﬁned in a ﬁeld of characteristic p (resp. 2) 
is called exceptional if Fd is PN (resp. APN) in Fpn (resp. F2n) for inﬁnitely many n. The 
(positive) exponent d of an exceptional monomial Fd is called an exceptional exponent.
For instance, based on this deﬁnition, the inverse function x → x2n−2 is not excep-
tional since the value of its positive exponent varies with the size of the ﬁeld.
Most of the results provided in this area are obtained by studying the number of points 
of some geometrical structure. This approach of ﬁnite geometry was used by Fernando 
Hernando and Gary McGuire [39] to prove that any inﬁnite class of APN monomials 
must have a quadratic or a Kasami exponent.
No equivalent of this result in characteristics p has been proved yet, but it is generally 
believed, as conjectured in [40], that in characteristic p, p odd prime, the only exceptional 
exponents are 2 and pt + 1, and in addition (3t + 1)/2 in characteristic 3, that is, the 
exponents given in Table 2. The notion of exceptional planar function can be generalized 
to any polynomial [41,42]. The most recent classiﬁcation can be found in [43].
4.2. Polynomial
Finding PN or APN polynomials which are not CCZ-equivalent to a known monomial 
has been a challenging task in the last few years. For instance, in characteristic 2, the 
ﬁrst APN function that is not CCZ-equivalent to any known function was discovered 
by Yves Edel, Gohar Khureghyan and Alexander Pott in 2005 [44]. This function is 
deﬁned in the ﬁeld F210 as F (x) = x3 + β · x36 with β ∈ αF25 \ {0} ∪ α2F25 \ {0} and 
α ∈ F210 of order 3. This discovery has inspired many other works in that direction. For 
instance, Lilya Budaghyan, Claude Carlet and Gregor Leander [45] have shown that the 
function x → x3 + Tr(x9) deﬁned over F2n is APN. They also partially demonstrate the 
CCZ-inequivalence of this function with the other known APN permutations. Later the 
study of functions of the form xd + g(x) where xd is APN have been extended to other 
exponents d such as d = 2n − 2, the exponent of the inverse function, to study functions 
of the form x → x−1 + g(x). Most of the currently known PN or APN polynomials 
are binomial or involve quadratic polynomials. Some examples of such polynomials are 
provided in Table 3.
For even n, several results indicate that the existence of APN permutations is more 
limited than for odd n. Already in [46], it is proved that a quadratic permutation of Zn2
with n even cannot be APN. Later, Xiang-dong Hou [47] proved the following result.
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The Banﬀ list of APN polynomials in dimension 6. The element α is primitive 
in F26 . These polynomials are not permutation.
1 x3
2 x3 + α11x6 + αx9
3 αx5 + x9 + α4x17 + αx18 + α4x20 + αx24 + α4x34 + αx40
4 α7x3 + x5 + α3x9 + α4x10 + x17 + α6x18
5 x3 + αx24 + x10
6 x3 + α17(x17 + x18 + x20 + x24)
7 x3 + α11x5 + α13x9 + x17 + α11x33 + x48
8 α25x5 + x9 + α38x12 + α25x18 + α25x36
9 α40x5 + α10x6 + α62x20 + α35x33 + α15x34 + α29x48
10 α34x6 + α52x9 + α48x12 + α6x20 + α9x33 + α23x34 + α25x40
11 x9 + α4(x10 + x18) + α9(x12 + x20 + x40)
12 α52x3 + α47x5 + αx6 + α9x9 + α44x12 + α47x33 + α10x34 + α33x40
13 α(x6 + x10 + x24 + x33) + x9 + α4x17
Theorem 4. Let n be even and k = n/2. Let P be a permutation polynomial of F2n with 
coeﬃcients in F2k , P ∈ F2k [x], then P cannot be APN.
In particular, a polynomial with coeﬃcients in a sub-ﬁeld F2 , is not APN. Until 
2009, this result was supporting the idea that there are no APN permutations in Zn2 for 
even n. Nevertheless, the challenge of ﬁnding APN functions or APN permutations have 
interested many researchers. In 2006, in a meeting held in the Banﬀ International research 
station, John F. Dillon presented a list of APN quadratic functions in dimension 6 (see 
Table 3). A similar list for dimension 7 and 8 can be found in [48].
As the exhaustive search is not possible in dimension 6, most of the research has been 
dedicated to quadratic polynomials. Nevertheless, in [49], Edel and Pott proposed a new 
technique, the switching method, for deriving new APN functions. From Theorem 9 
of [49], an instantiation of the switching method can be derived. It proceeds as follows:
• Select an APN function F : Zn2 → Zn2 , and u ∈ Zn2 .
• Create a Boolean function f : Zn2 → Z2 by solving a system of linear equations 
verifying that f(x) + f(x + a) + f(y) + f(y + a) = 0 if F (x) + F (x + a) + F (y) +
F (y + a) = 0, for all (x, y, a) ∈ (Zn2 )3.
• Then according to Theorem 9 of [49], the function G(X) = F (x) + uf(x) is APN.
Application of this method in dimensions 6 and 8 has produced new non-quadratic APN 
functions. For instance, from the function number 6 of the Banﬀ list (Table 3), the 
following function deﬁned in F26 [x] has been derived
F (x) = x3 + α17
(
x17 + x18 + x20 + x24
)
+ α18x9 + α36x18 + u9x36 + x21 + x42
+ Tr
(
α27x + α52x3 + α6x5 + α19x7 + α28x11 + α2x13
)
,
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is a non-quadratic APN function in dimension 6. Nevertheless, this method has not 
been successful at ﬁnding APN permutations in even dimension. Recently, Dillon et 
al. [4] provided an example of an APN permutation in F2n with even n. This function is 
deﬁned over F26 as follows:
F (x) = w45x60 + w41x58 + w43x57 + w4x56 + w50x54 + w20x53 + w45x52 + w20x51
+ w23x50 + w36x49 + w56x48 + w21x46 + w5x45 + w21x44 + w28x43 + w3x42
+ w59x41 + w58x40 + w57x39 + w53x38 + w37x37 + w40x36 + w18x35 + w41x34
+ w54x33 + w3x32 + w49x30 + w41x29 + w42x28 + w50x27 + w53x26 + w58x25
+ w9x24 + x23 + w28x22 + w3x21 + w21x20 + w52x19 + w60x17 + w59x16
+ w10x15 + w42x13 + w8x12 + w35x11 + w44x10 + w45x8 + w8x7 + w61x6
+ w59x5 + w20x4 + w12x3 + w37x2 + w2x, (3)
where w = α−2 and α is a root of the primitive polynomial x → x6+x4+x3+x +1. This 
function has algebraic degree 4 and is CCZ-equivalent to a known non-bijective quadratic 
APN function h(x) = x3 + x10 + αx24 which is the function number 5 in Table 3.
The idea of using CCZ-equivalence for ﬁnding APN permutations in F26 has so far 
been successful in producing, up to CCZ-equivalence, only one APN permutation. More 
generally, this function is the only known APN permutation of any F2n, n even, and the 
question of the existence of APN permutations for even n, n > 6, is still pending [4].
Some of the other methods proposed for constructing APN functions use AB functions, 
others make uses of APN functions in smaller or larger ﬁelds as starting points. These 
methods do not always guarantee that the resulting function is strictly APN, but just 
has a small diﬀerential uniformity. In Section 6 we discuss some other methods used by 
cryptographers to produce functions with small diﬀerential uniformity.
There has also been some works towards enumerating the number of CCZ-inequivalent 
APN functions over Zn2 when n ≤ 8. For n = 7, the latest known result [50] shows that 
there is at least 470, CCZ-inequivalent APN functions over Z72. These results illustrate 
the diﬃculty of ﬁnding such functions for large n in characteristic 2. Similar works for 
PN functions, can be found, e.g. [51], in characteristic p, when the dimension of the 
vectorial space is small.
5. The exponential and logarithm functions
In the context of the real functions, the exponential function is distinguished by the 
property of being its own derivative. A similar property holds for the discrete exponential 
function in ﬁnite ﬁelds.
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function G in Fpn is deﬁned as
G : Zpn−1 → Fpn , x → αx.
Then, for any diﬀerence a 
= 0 in Zpn−1, we have
G(x + a) − G(x) = αx+a − αx = αx(αa − 1) = (αa − 1)G(x), for all x ∈ Zpn−1.
As G is one-to-one, also all its derivatives are one-to-one. Thus, the discrete exponential 
function G is a PN function from the Abelian group (Zpn−1, +) to the Abelian group 
(Fpn , +). But it is not bijective. It can be extended to a bijective function in diﬀerent 
ways. The ﬁrst approach to be discussed next is to add one element to the domain of 
deﬁnition. The second approach consists of removing one element from the image space 
of the function and is presented at the end of this section.
5.1. The bijective discrete exponential and logarithm functions
A bijective extension of G is obtained by adding one element to the domain of G and 
deﬁning it as Zpn , and then setting F (x) = G(x), for x 
= pn − 1 and F (pn − 1) = 0. 
We call F the bijective discrete exponential function in Fpn . Its inverse is called the 
bijective discrete logarithm function in Fpn . These functions are promising candidates for 
S-boxes in cipher constructions and allow analysis of some other nonlinear functions. In 
particular, it was shown in [52] that the nonlinearity properties of the key multiplication 
operation in the block cipher IDEA [53] are related to nonlinearity properties of the 
bijective discrete exponential and logarithm functions with p = 216 + 1 and n = 1.
The resulting function F is at most diﬀerentially 4-uniform, which we can verify as 
follows. Given a ∈ Zpn , a 
= 0, and b ∈ Fpn we split the domain into four parts as follows 
to be able to use the PN property of the function G.
1. 0 ≤ x < pn − 1 − a: solve G(x + a) − G(x) = b.
2. x = pn − 1 − a: gives one solution if b = −G(pn − 1 − a).
3. pn − 1 − a < x < pn − 1: solve G(x + a − 1) − G(x) = b.
4. x = pn − 1: one solution if b = G(a − 1).
Each of the four cases gives at most one solution. Note that if a = pn − 1 the ﬁrst case 
is empty.
For cryptographic purposes the size of the domain is often selected as being a power 
of 2. Since p = 224 + 1 is the largest known Fermat prime, there are no larger primes of 
this form of practical size. Another approach is to consider F2n and extend the integer 
domain from Z2n−1 to Z2n . By identifying the set Z2n with the linear space Zn2 we 
can investigate the nonlinearity properties of the discrete exponential and logarithm 
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Arne Winterhof [54] were the ﬁrst to investigate the nonlinearity of the least signiﬁcant 
bit of the bijective discrete logarithm function. Let us denote by f the least signiﬁcant 
bit of a bijective discrete logarithm function F in Zn2 . Then it was proved in [54] that
L(f) ≤ 2n2n2 .
Later also the nonlinearity of other components of the bijective discrete logarithm has 
been investigated [55,56], and the following bound
L(fλ) ≤ 8
π2
(
2k+1 + 1
)(
ln
(
2n − 1)+ 2)2n2
was obtained in [56]. Here k is the position of the most signiﬁcant non-zero bit of the 
linear mask λ that deﬁnes the component fλ(x) = 〈λ, F (x)〉 of F . It was also shown 
that the linearity L(fλ) of a component fλ is invariant under rotation of the bit vector 
λ. Hence the least value k over all rotations of λ can be used. Recently, this bound was 
slightly improved in [57,58].
For very sparse masks, the upperbound can be improved as it was shown in [52] to 
give the following bound
L(fλ) ≤ 1 + nwH(λ)2n2 ,
where the Hamming weight of λ is denoted by wH(λ). This bound holds for n ≥ 5. The 
proof makes use of the fact that, by the rotation property, all one-bit masks have the 
same linearity upperbound as the least signiﬁcant bit.
Some experiments have been conducted to validate these bounds [56]. By these exper-
iments the nonlinearity of F grows with n at about the same rate as the nonlinearity of a 
single coordinate function. This indicates that the upperbound of linearity that increases 
exponentially with the length or with the Hamming weight of the masks is far too large. 
It remains an open problem how to make these bounds tighter to obtain better estimates 
of the apparently high nonlinearity of the bijective discrete logarithm function.
5.2. The Welch–Costas functions
We start again from the PN discrete exponential function G deﬁned in the beginning 
of this section and ﬁx n = 1. This function is PN from the Abelian group (Zp−1, +) to 
the Abelian group (Fp , +). To make it bijective, we subtract 1 from all values of G(x)
and then remove the element p − 1 from the original image set Fp = Zp to replace it 
by Zp−1. The resulting function is called the exponential Welch–Costas (EWC) function 
and we denote it by F in this subsection. Then F is a bijection in Zp−1 and
F (x) =
(
αx mod p
)− 1, for all x ∈ Zp−1.
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tions are APN [59].
These functions have found applications in cryptography. For example, the SAFER 
family of block ciphers [60,61] exploits EWC and LWC functions with parameters p =
28 + 1, α = 45 and n = 1.
The linearities of the EWC function F : Zp−1 → Zp−1 and the corresponding discrete 
exponential function G : Zp−1 → Zp have been studied in the context of the generalized 
deﬁnition of linearity in Abelian groups. By deﬁnition,
L(F ) = max
0≤a<p−1,0<b<p−1
∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈Zp−1
w
bF (x)
p−1 w
ax
p−1
∣∣∣∣, and
L(G) = max
0≤a<p−1,0<b<p
∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈Zp−1
wbG(x)p w
ax
p−1
∣∣∣∣.
Then 
√
p − 1 ≤ |L(F )| ≤ p − 1 and the same holds true for G. Moreover, it is quite 
straightforward to show using the PN property G and some ordinary properties of Fourier 
transforms that |L(G)| ≤ √p [62]. For the EWC function F the situation is not equally 
straightforward. Based on extensive experiments it was conjectured that the linearity 
of F is bounded from above by a constant times p 12+, where  is some small constant. 
This conjecture was proved to hold by Risto Hakala in [63]. Moreover, Hakala proved 
with the help of a method from Louis J. Mordell’s last paper (1972) that the following 
inequality holds
∣∣L(F )∣∣ ≤
(
2
π
ln p + 4
)√
p
and hence gave an upperbound that is asymptotically strictly less than the bound origi-
nally conjectured by Konstantinos Drakakis, Verónica Requena and Gary McGuire [62].
To summarize, let us note that the square root of the size of the domain is the domi-
nating factor of all linearity bounds of the diﬀerent variants of the discrete exponential 
and logarithmic functions studied in this section. This factor is multiplied by a factor 
that is only of logarithmic of the size of the domain of the function. It is an interesting 
question, how small the logarithmic factor can be made in particular in the case of the 
vectorial Boolean function based on the bijective discrete logarithm function.
6. Applications in cryptography
In this section, we discuss the use of PN and APN functions in the symmetric key 
cryptographic algorithms such as block ciphers and hash functions. Such constructions 
are usually deﬁned iteratively, by repeating interleaving nonlinear and linear layers. The 
nonlinear layers ensure the confusion through a parameterized permutation. The linear 
layers ensure the diﬀusion through the cipher.
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discussing S-boxes deﬁned on extension of Z2. Two main types of iterative structures can 
be distinguished, the Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) and the Feistel Network 
with all its generalizations. The Feistel structure guarantees bijectivity independently of 
the bijectivity of the round functions that are used to modify the state. Nevertheless, as 
summarized in [64], these round functions should be chosen with care since some attacks 
can take advantage of non-injective or non-surjective S-boxes. For SPN structures the 
S-boxes must be bijective.
6.1. Computation of the diﬀerence table
One of the obstacles encountered in the search of APN functions is the veriﬁcation of 
this property which algorithmically requires the computation of the values of a half of 
the derivatives. More precisely [36], given a hyperplane H, if for all a ∈ H and for all 
b ∈ Znp we have δ(a, b) ≤ 2, then the function is APN. The time for such computation 
is 22n−1. For particular polynomials, such as monomials over Fpn this computation can 
be reduced to the study of only one derivative as explained in Section 4.1. But also 
other special classes of functions have been identiﬁed where fast veriﬁcation of the APN 
property is possible. One such class is composed of polynomials with coeﬃcients in a 
sub-ﬁeld [65]. In particular, for a polynomial P : F2n → F2n which has coeﬃcients in 
F2 we have δ(a, b) = δ(a2
i
, b2
i), for all 0 < i < n. In particular, for such polynomials 
we have that δ(1, b) = δ(1, b2i), for all 0 < i < n. Using this property one can prove 
that, if n is odd and for all b ∈ F2n δ(1, b) = 0 or 2, then δ(1, 1) = 2 if P (0) = 0. Notice 
that similar observations can be used to prove the non-existence of APN permutation 
polynomial P of F2n when n = 2k with P ∈ F2 [x], P (0) = 0. Indeed from the cyclotomic 
class we deduce that for such polynomials P (1) = 1, and 
∑
x P (x) =
∑
b,δ(1,b)=2 b = 0. 
From the number of elements in the cyclotomic class of order greater than 2 we deduce 
a contradiction.
For usage in cryptography, the diﬀerential properties of a function F : Zn2 → Zm2 , are 
often presented in a two dimensional array called the diﬀerence distribution table (DDT) 
denoted by TF . The entries of TF are the values of δ(a, b) for all a ∈ Znp and b ∈ Zmp . 
For an APN function, all entries in this table for a 
= 0 are equal to either 0 or 2. An 
example of a DDT of a permutation over Z32 is given in Table 4. If F is a permutation, 
δ(a, 0) = 0 for all a 
= 0.
Knowing the representation, the properties summarized in the previous paragraph 
can be visually observed on this table. For instance, for a monomial function, all lines of 
the DDT are permutations of each other.
More generally, the complete knowledge of the DDT of an APN function allows us to 
recover the values of the function. Indeed, from the fact that δ(a, b) = 2 it follows that 
there exists a unique pair (x, x + a) such that f(x + a) + f(x) = b. Writing these partial 
equations allows us to determine one of the corresponding functions in the class of the 
equivalence. For instance from Table 4, we have that f(0) + f(1) = 1, 3, 5 or 7, assuming 
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A diﬀerence distribution table of an APN permutation deﬁned over Z32.
a/b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
3 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 0
4 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2
5 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0
6 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0
7 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 2
that f(0) = 0 gives us only 4 values for f(1). The number of derived partial equations 
are enough to determine one of the APN functions in the class of equivalence.
The diﬀerence tables TF and TG of two aﬃne equivalent functions F and G are 
permutation of each others. In particular, if G = F (L1(x)) with L1 an aﬃne permutation, 
we have δG(a, b) = δF (L1(a), b), for all a and b, meaning that the rows of TG are the 
same as the rows of TF , but they appear in a permuted order. Similarly, if G = L2(F (x))
with L2 an aﬃne permutation, we have δG(a, b) = δF (a, L−12 (b)) and the columns of TG
are the same as the ones of TF but they appear in a permuted order. The extended aﬃne 
equivalence is less visual, since if G(x) = F (x) + L(x) then δG(a, b) = δF (a, b + L(a)).
6.2. Provable security
Diﬀerential cryptanalysis is a statistical method of cryptanalysis which was devel-
oped for attacking the NSA block cipher DES [3]. After its introduction, Kaisa Nyberg 
and Lars R. Knudsen studied the possibility of designing a DES-type block cipher with 
provable resistance against diﬀerential attacks. In [66,67], they provide bounds on the 
probability of a 4-round DES-like cipher. The number of rounds can be reduced to three 
if the DES-like cipher has a bijective round function. The bounds were later improved 
by Kazumaro Aoki [68]. This result shows a close relationship between the diﬀerential 
property of the round function and the resistance of the cipher to diﬀerential cryptanal-
ysis. Based of this idea Nyberg and Knudsen proposed a 64-bit DES-like cipher which 
makes use of the quadratic monomial x → x3 over the ﬁeld Z332 . The designers called 
the cipher by the name CRADIC standing for “Cipher Resistant Against Diﬀerential
Cryptanalysis”, while in the literature it is better known as the KN cipher. It was soon 
broken by higher order diﬀerential attacks [69] that make use of the low algebraic degree 
of the x3 function. A similar attack can be conducted if instead of the x3 function the 
inverse function x−1 was used. Recently, Christina Boura and Anne Canteaut [70] fol-
lowed the suggestion given in [67] and investigated the inverses of the quadratic functions 
x2
k+1 as the round function for a CRADIC-like cipher and show positive results about 
its potential resistance against algebraic attacks.
In [71], Mitsuru Matsui generalized the notion of provable security for unbalanced 
Feistel structures and other modiﬁed structures that were later to be known as MISTY 
structures. Since in 1996, APN permutations over Zn2 with n even were believed not to 
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to use APN permutations. He showed that in this way the security against diﬀerential 
cryptanalysis is better than what one would obtain by [66] using branches of equal size 
and an even number of bits. In 1997, based on this idea, Matsui proposed the MISTY 
ciphers [72]. These ciphers are imbrications of Feistel networks deﬁned over 64 bits, 32 
bits and 16 bits. The innermost structure of these ciphers is an unbalanced modiﬁed 
Feistel network which uses as round functions two nonlinear permutations of 7 and 9 
bits. To limit the hardware print, the 7-bit S-box was chosen among linear transforms of 
monomials with exponents of weight three. The resulting exponent is a Welsh exponent. 
It is interesting to note that while the inﬁnite family of monomials with Welsh exponent 
d = 2m +3, deﬁned over F2n , for n = 2m +1 odd, was not proved APN until in 1999 [34,
35] (see Section 4.1), such an APN was relatively easy to ﬁnd in this dimension by 
computer search. The algebraic degree of this function is 3. A quadratic function was 
chosen for the 9-bit S-box. Using similar design principles, new diﬀerent S-boxes have 
been selected for the KASUMI variant of MISTY [73].
Later similar works have been conducted to prove the security of some generalized 
Feistel or SPN constructions against linear and diﬀerential cryptanalysis. These results 
show that S-boxes with good diﬀerential properties do not alone guarantee the resistance 
against diﬀerential cryptanalysis. Indeed, one should also take into consideration the 
number of S-boxes that are activated when injecting a diﬀerence between two plaintexts. 
To guarantee that this number is suﬃciently large, the notion of branch number [74] has 
been introduced to capture this behavior of the diﬀusion layer and used in providing 
security claims for block-oriented primitives, such as the AES.
In the AES, certain linear and non-linear functional components can be composed 
together to a larger functional entity called a Super S-box to produced improved crypt-
analysis on the AES [75–77], AES-like block ciphers and hash functions. In [78], Anne 
Canteaut and Joëlle Roué studied diﬀerential properties of combinations of a linear diﬀu-
sion layer and an S-box layer over two rounds and derived criteria for choosing functions 
for these layers in an optimal way.
6.3. S-boxes in practice
As recalled in Section 3.3, linear and diﬀerential properties of a function are preserved 
by the aﬃne and EA-equivalence as well as by the CCZ-equivalence. While the ﬁrst two 
equivalences preserve also algebraic degree of the function, the implementation cost of 
the nonlinear layer is diﬀerent depending of the chosen function in the equivalence set. 
To select the best S-box in regard to particular constraints related to the implementation 
environment such as speed or physical attacks, it is common to check the cost of a set 
of functions in the aﬃne equivalence set.
Usage of the aﬃne equivalence to limit the implementation cost can be found already 
in [71] for the design of the MISTY block cipher. Later Leander and Poschmann [79]
derived the list of all the diﬀerentially 4-uniform permutations of Z42. Explanation on 
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approach is not eﬀective for larger dimension and in [80], another method to ﬁnd all 
APN permutations up to dimension 5 is described.
In more recent designs, aﬃne equivalence has been used to ﬁnd S-boxes with low la-
tency [81] and S-boxes easier to protect against side channel attacks [64,82,83]. In these 
recent works, no concrete methods are proposed to ﬁnd functions which meet the re-
quirements and the functions are found by randomly searching for the best ones among 
the equivalent functions. This approach allows search while preserving good diﬀerential 
and nonlinearity properties. Another approach is to focus at limiting the number of in-
structions needed for the implementation of S-boxes. For instance in [84], the authors 
concentrate on 4-bit S-boxes and show how to ﬁnd a permutation which is diﬀeren-
tially 4-uniform, using only 9 instructions. This S-box is good also with respect to other 
nonlinearity properties.
In general, while APN functions are mathematically interesting, their usefulness for 
cryptography is limited. Next we will discuss some well-known designs, the choices made 
when selecting the S-boxes, and the resulting security of these constructions.
AES and locally-APN functions. When in 1998, the NIST has launched a competition 
with the goal of establishing a new block cipher standard, the list of known APN per-
mutations was still relatively small and no APN permutation in even dimensions was 
known. Due to this reason and some designs restrictions, diﬀerentially 4-uniform S-boxes 
were considered in the design of some ciphers such as E2, the ancestor of Camellia [85], 
AES [29] and also in more recent designs (e.g. [86,81,87]).
In the design of the AES block cipher, Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen deﬁned 
the S-box as an aﬃne transformation of the inverse function in the ﬁnite ﬁeld F28 . This 
permutation, which is diﬀerentially 4-uniform [8], achieves the best known diﬀerential 
uniformity in this space of dimension 8. In particular, the derivatives of this function are 
such that δ(1, 1) = 4 and for all b 
= 1, δ(1, b) ≤ 2. In [88], this function gave rise to the 
notion of locally-APN monomials.
Deﬁnition 6. (See [88].) Let Fd : F2n → F2n , x → xd be a power function. The function 
F is called locally-APN if for all b 
= 0, 1 we have δ(1, b) ≤ 2.
There is some reason to believe that the locally-APN S-boxes might provide better 
resistance to diﬀerential cryptanalysis than other functions with the same diﬀerential 
uniformity. This will be demonstrated next using a cryptographic toy example. Let us 
ﬁrst recall some notation related to the diﬀerential spectrum of a function. Generalizing 
the notation of [89], for a ﬁxed a ∈ Znq , let us denote by ωai the quantity
ωai =
∣∣{b ∣∣ δ(a, b) = i}∣∣.
The diﬀerential spectrum of F is then deﬁned as the sequence of all ωai , i ≤ δ(F ). In 
characteristic 2, we have ωai 
= 0 only for even values of i. If F is a monomial function, the 
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knowledge of ω1i is enough to determine the whole spectrum. The notion of locally-APN 
monomial has later been generalized to the notion of locally diﬀerentially λ-uniform 
in [90].
Given an S-box S = Si, the probability p = pi of the diﬀerential deﬁned in Fig. 1 can 
be computed as the sum of the probabilities of all diﬀerential trails as
p =
∑
b
(
2−nδ(1, b)
)2
.
For the APN S-box S0 we have that p0 = 2−n+1. For the diﬀerentially 4-uniform locally 
APN S-box S1 we have p1 = 2−n+1 − 23−2n. The diﬀerentially 4-uniform S-box S2 has a 
2-valued diﬀerential spectrum and p2 = 22−n. This example demonstrates that a locally 
APN S-box can give smaller diﬀerential probabilities than other diﬀerentially 4-uniform 
S-boxes.
It was shown in [79] that among the permutations of Z42 the only equivalence class 
comprising of diﬀerentially 4-uniform and locally-APN functions corresponds to the one 
of the inverse function. Up to equivalence, the inverse function is the only known diﬀer-
entially 4-uniform locally-APN function in Zn2 , for even n.
Because of its very good diﬀerential and linear properties, many other cryptographic 
primitives are using functions aﬃne equivalent to the inverse function for confusion. In 
the beginning of this century [92] it has been thought from the point of view of algebraic 
cryptanalysis that the property x × x−1 = 1 is suspect. Nevertheless, as shown in [93], 
the XSL algorithm exploiting this property did not work as expected. Up to now, no 
attack on the AES exploiting this property has been found.
Keccak and quadratic functions. Among other cryptographic standards, we describe 
brieﬂy some properties of the winner Keccak [94] of the SHA3 competition organized 
by the NIST. The design of this hash function is based on a sponge construction using 
an internal permutation of 800 or 1600 bits. Among the diﬀerent operations which com-
pose this permutation, the nonlinear layer is deﬁned as a parallel application of a 5-bit 
permutation S-box χ : Z52 → Z52 deﬁned coordinate by coordinate as follows:
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⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
x0 + x2 + x1x2
x1 + x3 + x2x3
x2 + x4 + x3x4
x3 + x0 + x4x0
x4 + x1 + x0x1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (4)
All components of this S-box are quadratic. By analyzing the Keccak function, one 
can see that the values of δ(a, b) are related to the Hamming weight of a. In particular, 
δ(a, b) ∈ {0, 8} for a of weight 1, δ(a, b) ∈ {0, 4} for a of weight 2, and ﬁnally, δ(a, b) ∈
{0, 2} for a of weight 4 or 5. If a is of weight 3, we have δ(a, b) ∈ {0, 4} or δ(a, b) ∈ {0, 2}
depending on the distribution of the bits 1 in the binary representation of a.
In general, the derivatives of quadratic functions are 2t-to-1. For the components of the 
Keccak function, t varies from 1 to 3. The Keccak function (4) serves as a demonstration 
of the fact that even an S-box with non-APN quadratic components can be used to obtain 
a solid cryptographic primitive. Thanks to the strong diﬀusion, only few rounds of the 
Keccak permutation can be distinguished from random using a diﬀerential distinguisher.
FIDES and the APN permutation in dimension 6. It was not until in 2013 when the 
remarkable APN permutation over F26 found its use in a cryptographic design. The 
permutation of the FIDES [83] authenticated encryption primitive is composed of 32 
parallel applications of this APN permutation. The polynomial representation of it being 
rather complex to evaluate, implementation as a truth table is recommended.
To evaluate the resistance against other cryptanalytic attacks, also other crypto-
graphic properties of this APN permutation are relevant. From the polynomial provided 
in (3), one can check that the algebraic degree of this function is 4. As recalled in Sec-
tion 3.1, the minimal known linearity of a permutation deﬁned over F2n for n even is 
2n/2+1 and is equal to 16 in dimension 6. This value which is reached by the inverse 
function is also reached by this APN permutation. As the inverse function is locally-
APN and has algebraic degree 5, diﬀerential and linear attacks on this cipher might 
be similar independently of the choice of S-box EA-equivalent to the inverse function or 
of (3). Notice that among others, FIDES is an example of construction where using APN 
S-boxes does not guarantee its security. For instance in [95], using a guess-and-determine 
method, an attack on the full primitive is proposed. This attack relies on the weakness 
of the diﬀusion provided by the linear layer. The diﬀerential properties of the S-box do 
not play any role in this attack.
6.4. Large S-boxes
For implementation reasons, S-boxes are often deﬁned as permutation of 4 or 8-bits. 
Since the probability of a diﬀerential is related to the size of the S-box, and is deﬁned 
by P [a → b] = δ(a,b)2n , it would be more beneﬁcial to use large S-boxes. After the design 
of the KN cipher, where the idea of a large S-box appears for the ﬁrst time, also other 
works towards this direction have appeared. For instance, as 8-bit S-boxes are usually 
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more costly to implement, cryptographers have been investigating methods to construct 
large S-boxes from smaller ones. Such an idea was taken into consideration for instance 
in the design of ICEBERG [96] and ZORRO [82]. The resistance to diﬀerential and linear 
cryptanalysis is then measured in regard to the 8-bit S-box. Inspired by [97], the authors 
of PICARO explain in [64] why the selected S-box, deﬁned over F28 and admitting pre-
sentation as a function of two bivariate polynomials in F24 , is a suitable candidate for an 
eﬃcient side channel resistant cipher. More discussion on such approaches can be found 
in [82]. While the main objective has been to limit the number of operations necessary for 
the implementation and to ensure a certain protection against side-channel attacks, the 
design of a function with small diﬀerential uniformity and linearity remains as another 
important goal. Therefore the direction of study proposed in [97] seems interesting for 
cryptography.
6.5. Exploiting the APN property of the S-boxes in cryptanalysis
Since the APN property implies exceptional and extreme behavior, it can in some 
situations lead to vulnerabilities of the cipher where APN components are being used. 
In [98], Anne Canteaut and Marìa Naya-Plasencia present an attack on the hash function 
MARACA proposed to the SHA3 competition and show that the higher the number of 
input diﬀerences which can lead to the same output diﬀerence is, the better the attack 
works. The quantity describing the power of the attack is denoted by ∇F and is deﬁned 
as
∇F = max
b∈Zn2
#DF (b) where DF (b) =
{
a
∣∣ x, F (a) + F (x + a) = b for some x}.
Given a permutation function F over Zn2 , a lower bound on ∇F is 2n/ΔF . The func-
tions with small diﬀerential uniformity are the ones with the largest ∇F value.
Among the functions for which the value of ∇F is fully determined we give the example 
of the quadratic monomials. Let Qt : x → x2t+1 over F2n and let s = gcd(t, n) ≥ 1, one 
can show that for any a, b in F2n , if x is a solution of Qt(x) + Qt(x + a) = b, the set of 
solutions of this equation is x + aF2s . Meaning that for all a, b in F2n , δ(a, b) ∈ {0, 2s}
and ∇F = 2n−s.
The concept of two-valued diﬀerential spectrum of a vectorial Boolean function is 
studied in [89]. In particular, let ΔF be the diﬀerential uniformity of a monomial function 
F (x) = xd. This function is diﬀerentially two-valued if for all b ∈ F2n , δ(1, b) is equal to 
0 or ΔF . In this case it can be shown [89] that ΔF is a power of two. Some monomials 
with Kasami exponent have a two-valued diﬀerential spectrum.
Theorem 5. (See [89].) Let Kt : x → x22t−2t+1 over F2n . We assume that n 
= 3t and 
s = gcd(n, t) with n/s odd. Then, for any b ∈ F2n , δ(b) ∈ {0, 2s}.
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if and only if ∇F · ΔF = 2n holds.
The attack described in [98] does not take advantage of only the size of DF (b), but 
also of the structure of these sets, and gives rise to the following generalization of crooked 
functions originally deﬁned in [99].
Deﬁnition 7. (See [99,98].) A function F : Zn2 → Zn2 is said to be crooked (resp. crooked 
of co-dimension d ≥ 1) if for any non-zero b ∈ Zn2 , Im(DaF ) is an aﬃne subspace of 
co-dimension 1 (resp. co-dimension d).
The function F is weakly crooked (resp. weakly crooked of co-dimension d) if Im(DaF )
is contained in an aﬃne subspace of co-dimension 1 (resp. co-dimension d).
Crooked permutations are AB and therefore APN Boolean functions on an odd num-
ber of variables. In [67], all quadratic permutation monomials were proved crooked. 
In [98] it is conjectured that crooked permutations of any co-dimension are quadratic.
While AB and APN functions are related to the well known cryptanalytic methods, 
the work of Canteaut and Naya-Plasencia shows nevertheless that crooked functions 
might be avoided in some cryptographic applications.
6.6. Other types of ciphers
Not all symmetric cryptographic primitives use S-boxes. Instead, nonlinearity can 
be ensured by the use of nonlinear operations such as modular addition. Examples of 
such primitives are the block ciphers TEA, XTEA, as well as the hash functions MD5, 
SHA-1, SHA-2, and the recent 3rd round SHA-3 candidates: SKEIN and BLAKE. For 
constructions like the ARX one, the analysis presented in this paper may seem useless 
since the confusion is ensured by simple nonlinear operations such as AND and modular 
additions.
More recently, the NSA has published two new block ciphers [100], SIMON and 
SPECK which are deﬁned as generalized Feistel ciphers. The nonlinearity of SIMON 
is ensured by a simple AND. For a cipher of 2b bits, one can consider it as a Super-Sbox 
(see Section 6.4) of b bits which is far from being APN and can be proved diﬀerentially 
2b−2-uniform. For this cipher, the security against diﬀerential cryptanalysis is then en-
sured primarily by repeating this simple round function a large number of times. The 
nonlinearity of the 2b-bit block cipher SPECK is ensured by a modular addition of b
state-bits with the other b state bits. The diﬀusion being faster than the one of the 
SIMON cipher, less rounds are required.
7. Conclusion
The planar, bent and generalized bent functions have been known in the mathematical 
literature since the 1980s. In the late 1980s the importance of highly nonlinear functions 
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correlation attacks on stream ciphers, and later by Nyberg in the early 1990s after the 
introduction of the diﬀerential cryptanalysis method. The APN functions, which have 
the optimal properties for oﬀering resistance against diﬀerential cryptanalysis, have since 
then been an object of intensive study by many mathematicians, and achieved a lot of 
interest for its own sake.
The goal of this brief survey has been to describe the state of the art of the APN and 
other closely related highly nonlinear functions from the point of view of a cryptographer. 
Still in late 1990s the designers of symmetric key cryptographic algorithms considered 
it of paramount importance to choose the nonlinear building block of their ciphers to 
have the best possible nonlinearity properties. In his hardware oriented MISTY designs, 
Matsui split the 16-bit state into two odd parts of diﬀerent length to be able to use 
APN permutations. The designers Daemen and Rijmen of the AES algorithm, which 
was targeted for implementation also in software, could not go that far, and had to make 
a suboptimal choice which was the diﬀerentially 4-uniform inverse function.
Since then the cryptographic research community has gained a lot of new experience 
and understanding about the roles the diﬀerent components have in providing crypto-
graphic security. In this survey, we discussed FIDES, an example of recent designs with 
optimally nonlinear components, which was immediately broken due to its weaknesses in 
the linear component. The attack on MARACA exploits the observation that the evenly 
distributed diﬀerences, which make the diﬀerential probabilities small, make it possible 
to get a certain output diﬀerence from a maximum number of diﬀerent input diﬀerences. 
On the other hand, several examples of very strong cryptographic designs are known 
that do not have optimal or even close to optimal nonlinearity in their components but 
achieve their strength by a large number of iterations.
The optimal or close to optimal nonlinearity and diﬀerential uniformity can oﬀer one 
foundation for achieving solid arguments in favor of cryptographic strength. But it can-
not be claimed suﬃcient and neither does it seem necessary. Still, the mathematical 
analysis of cryptographic building blocks remains valuable. In particular, new results on 
mathematical constructions of functions that can be implemented eﬃciently and oﬀer 
protection to some diﬀerent attacks simultaneously would be appreciated by cryptogra-
phers.
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